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Abstract 
This article provides a brief and in- 
formative overvlovervlew of the overall devel- 
opment of early warning over past 
years. It also includes references to the 
author's own involvement in thefzeld as 
Director of the Centrefor Refugee Stud- 
ies and, later, Director of the Preven- 
tion/Early Warning Unit. 
Cet article fournit un sumo1 succinct et 
factuel du dheloppement gkzhal du 
phhom2ne de l'alerte prhentive dans 
les dem&es annkes. On y retrouve no- 
tamment des informations sur l'impli- 
cation personnelle de l'auteur dans ce 
domaine en su qualitd de directeur du 
 en tre d'lhdes sur les R@@s et, par 
la suite, de 1'Unitk Prt?uention/Alerte 
Prhen tive. 
There are two historical sources for the 
use of early warning as a concept. One 
is to be found in the intelligence com- 
munity. Early warning referred to a 
party A possessing advance notifica- 
tion of an immanent hostile act by an 
enemy B enabling A to undertake pre- 
ventive action which could deter or 
even compel B to cancel the planned 
action. A second source is to be found 
in reference to natural humanitarian 
disasters, initially with respect to 
weather storms or earthquakes, but 
then applied to draught conditions in 
order to anticipate famines. Thus, the 
Food and Agricultural Organization 
(FAO) developed the first early warn- 
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ing system that was not self-defensive. 
It was designed to enable the FA0 to 
stockpile and locate food supplies to 
prevent famine. 
The first type of early warning sys- 
tem was designed to enable action to 
be taken to deter an enemy's threat or 
mitigate its effects. The second was 
also concerned with taking action, but 
to prevent or mitigate suffering of 
others. 
In the UN system, early warning 
was initially associated with the first 
type and traditional intelligence 
gathering to detect, deter, prevent, or 
counter hostile ads against UN peace- 
keepers in the Congo.' The roots of its 
contemporary conception, however, 
are to be found in the humanitarian 
area. Intent on enabling the UN to pre- 
pare for and perhaps even mitigate the 
causes of forced migration, a 1981 
study by Prince Sadruddin for the UN 
Commission on Human Rights set 
forth anumber of push and pull factors 
which contributed to forced migration. 
Prince Sadruddin recommended the 
creation of an early warning system 
within the UN to study and track these 
push and pull factors. This emphasis 
was reinforced when the Group of 
Government Experts to Avert New 
Refugee Flows formally requested the 
UN Secretary-General to establish an 
office to gather more complex informa- 
tion on refugee flows, and to report on 
that information in a timely fashion. 
The UN system initially attempted 
to structure itself on the nation-state 
model by appending an intelligence 
apparatus to the executive office. Perez 
de Cuellar initiated ORCI, the Organi- 
zation for Research and the Collection 
of Information in 1987 (Ramcharan 
1991). The Secretary-General also en- 
visioned that ORCI would serve the 
security as well as humanitarian man- 
date of the UN. In a perspective paper 
submitted to the General Assembly in 
the same year in which he established 
ORCI (A/42/512), he stated: 
The United Nations must . . , give 
very high priority in the 1980s to 
monitoring potential causes af con- 
flict and to communicating w@ning 
signs to those in a position to allevi- 
ate the situation. First responslibility 
should lie with the security Cbuncil 
and with the Secretary-General who 
will need to have the means to mount 
a global watch. Given the stroag eco- 
nomic and social factors in regional 
violence, economic and social klevel- 
opments will have to be followed and 
assessed in terms of their relevance 
to international security [my itqlic~].~ 
The intelligence related to security 
differed from the intelligence capacity 
developed by the UN peacekqepers in 
the Congo crisis. The new sewity in- 
telligence was not related to deterring, 
deflecting, or countering hostile ac- 
tions directed at military troDpS, but 
rather to assist in preventivie diplo- 
macy. The latter use of securi 
gence is distinct from, but re 7 ated to, 
early warning geared to miltigating 
suffering resulting from sociwy and 
politically produced humaoitarian 
disasters such as in alleviatina the con- 
ditions which produce refug~s.  
It was in the latter capacity ba t  I, as 
Director for the Centre for Refugee 
Studies at York University, became 
involved with ORCI as an qcademic 
research partner in the initial attempt 
to develop a Humanitarian Early 
Warning System. HEW had two foci- 
the anticipation of refugee flows so 
that steps could be taken in advance to 
ensure health, water and food isupplies 
as well as shelter were in place to miti- 
gate the suffering of the refu ees, and 
the anticipation of refugee 'h ows so 
that preventive action could be taken 
to alleviate the causes stimulating the 
flow. 
The costly resources need4 to com- 
prehensively gather, let alo* assess, 
4 Rcfugc, Vol. 16, No. 1 
analy e and disseminate the informa- 
tion, k ere just not available. The chief 
officeks of a very small staff did not 
even have the funds available to travel 
to meetings to discuss early warning in 
developing a partnership with re- 
search units based at universities. In 
the Wd, Boutros Boutros-Ghali abol- 
ished ORCI. 
Sirlce that time, particularly in the 
aftenpath of the Rwanda fiasco, within 
the system, both the political (DPA 
and DPKO) and the humanitarian 
arms of the UN involved in global is- 
sues (both DHA and the UNHCR) 
have ~ecognized the need for an inter- 
natiobal intelligence analysis capabil- 
ity. l$e UN in June of 1995 developed 
the Rolicy Analysis Team in the De- 
parWent of Political Affairs (DPA) to 
"strmgthen DPA's early warning and 
analf tical capacity" (Ramcharan 1996, 
3) to make policy recommendations. 
The &partment of Humanitarian Af- 
fairs (DHA) has developed its Hu- 
man tarian Early Warning System 
(HE 4 S) (rooted in a complex indicator 
mod41) as well as its IRIN information 
sharihg system on the Great Lakes re- 
gion of Africa. The Department of 
Peacdpkeeping Operations (DPKO) has 
developed an Oversight Group to en- 
sure the exchange of information and 
analpis between departments. These 
thred branches meet at least weekly 
unddr the auspices of the Secretary- 
Genelral as an Interdepartmental Task 
Force to compare notes, determine 
priorbties, and devise strategies. Left 
out df this loop, but integral to early 
warding, is the monitoring work of the 
United Nations Commission for 
H m a n   right^.^ In Geneva, DI-IA has 
also fleveloped RefugeeNet as a com- 
plelrientary humanitarian input into 
the development of an early warning 
capaety. 
In addition to the UN initiatives, 
projqcts underway in this field are lo- 
cate# among three other groups- 
NGQs, academia, and states. The NGO 
sectdr--such as the Camegie Commis- 
sionh the Council on Foreign Relations 
in New York, International Alert in 
London-have initiated different 
modkls of early warning geared to dif- 
ferent forms of preventive diplomacy 
and different organizational models. A 
number of academics have attempted 
to develop theoretical models based on 
indicator systems and/or a large 
number of case studies. Finally, indi- 
vidual states on their own have taken 
up the issue of early warning-for ex- 
ample, in the CIA funding of the Mi- 
nority-at-Risk project. 
NGOs, with the cooperation and 
involvement of some international 
agencies such as the UNI-ICR, have at- 
tempted to develop a network model 
which depends on voluntary coopera- 
tion of a number of individuals and 
organizations. A key component is the 
sharing of information. Amnesty Inter- 
national is perhaps the most famous 
organization in the field of individual 
human rights abuses which utilizes a 
variation of this model. The various 
"Watch" organizations provide other 
examples. Academics and research 
centres (PIOOM in Holland, Ted 
Gurr's University of Maryland team, 
Hayward Alker, the Harvard group, 
have all attempted to develop theoreti- 
cal models based on indicators and/or 
on comparative case studies: but have 
not had the resources to test the com- 
peting models and settle on one or two 
for de~elopment.~ Though prelimi- 
nary attempts have been made to coor- 
dinate that research, mostly under the 
initiative of Ted Gurr, the develop- 
ment of a systematic network to deal 
with the theoretical arm can best be 
described as being at a primitive stage 
of development, even if the models 
themselves are much more advanced. 
The development of these theoretical 
models based on long term case study 
analysis seems esoteric compared with 
the urgency of the various crises in the 
field and the suspicion that such long 
term case study analyses can have little 
impact on a crisis which seems to be 
suddenly triggered by the crash of a 
plane carrying the President of a coun- 
try (Rwanda) and the need to respond 
immediately to a conflict which ap- 
pears to emerge like a volcano without 
warning. 
The fourth structural component of 
an early warning system are states. 
nough no state alone, except perhaps 
for the United States, has the capacity 
to develop and operate an early wam- 
ing system to cover all potential com- 
plex emergencies on its own, states are 
reluctant to develop early warning sys- 
tems as part of a consortium6 lest the 
results of such early warnings entail 
that they become involved in humani- 
tarian actions which are not compat- 
ible or even run contrary to their self 
interests. Why have early warnings if 
you might not want to heed them? Yet 
only states have the basic capacity to 
manage such conflicts. And states, 
willy nilly, become involved, however 
reluctantly, in the humanitarian di- 
lemmas of most complex emergencies. 
However, very recent efforts have 
been taken to develop a consortium of 
all four groups to combine efforts to 
develop synergies, since none of the 
individual organizations or the 
smaller internationally-minded states 
on their own have the resources or ca- 
pacity to monitor the myriad of com- 
plexemergencies around the globe. An 
NGO UK-based initiative, facilitated 
by International Alert, has formed a 
Working Group on Early Warning and 
Conflict Prevention to develop a net- 
work-based early warning and conflict 
prevention capacity. A consortium of 
agencies, academic research units, 
NGOs, and hopefully, internationally- 
minded states has combined efforts to 
develop a true international operating 
network involving all these groups in a 
single early warning system. The or- 
ganization that resulted is called 
FEWER, the Forum for Early Warning 
and Emergency Response, founded in 
September of 1996.7 
The basic conception of early warn- 
ing is based on a central system of 
indicators to provide guidance for in- 
dependent specialized networks fo- 
cused on crisis areas to gather and 
analyze data and develop response 
scenarios in a continuing system of 
monitoring. The linkage with erner- 
gency response has yet to be worked 
out. 
With the development of a formal 
international consortium in this area, 
hopefully more attention can be 
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 shifted from structural problems to the 
issue of making such a system effective. 
III 
Notes 
1. Cf. A. Walter Dorn and David J. H. Bell, 
"lntelligence and Peacekeeping: The UN 
Operation in the Congo, 1960-64," Inter-
national Peacekeeping 1, no. 2 (Spring 
1995): 11-33. 
2. This quote was brought to my attention by 
B. G. Ramcharan at the Clingendael 
conference. Cf. B. G. Ramcharan, The In-
ternational Law and Practice of Early- 
Warning and Preventive Diplomacy, 1991, 
Chapter IV (Dordrecht, Boston: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers). 
3. In his initial address to the Commission on 
Human Rights in 1994, the High Com-
missioner for Human Rights stated: "1 shall 
look into the viability of an 'early warning' 
mechanism that would enable us to take 
action in a timely manner to protect human 
rights." In his first report to the UN General 
Assembly, he stated that, "It will be 
important in the future [my italics] to have 
as early notice as possible of situations in 
which various elements of the United 
Nations human rights program could playa 
role in preventing the outbreak of serious 
violations of human rights." (A/49 /36, 
para. 66) Cf. Ramcharan 1996 for a more 
expansive discussion of these 
developments. 
4. The following list of some early warning 
modellers attempts to summarize the 
approach of each of them: 
i) Dr. John Davies, Center for Interna-
tional Development and Conflict 
Management, University of Maryland, 
works with GEDS (Global Event Data 
System), a near-real time data analysis 
of actions and reactions to crises as 
they arise; 
ii) Dr. Helen Fein, Executive Director of 
the Institute for the Study for Genocide 
at Harvard University in Cambridge, in 
her studies on genocide depicts 
genocide as a reactive or retributive 
response by elites who use genocide 
and massacre as instruments of policy 
in the absence of either internal social 
controls and external interventions; she 
has already tentatively applied her 
model to the Rwandan situation in an 
article in Refuge 14, no. 5, October 
1994; 
iii) Barbara Harff, Department of Political 
Science at the U.S. Naval Academy at 
Annapolis, and Ted Gurr, leading 
scholar and researcher in Early Warn-
ing research, have worked on devel-
oping a model of Early Warning 
applied to Intercommunal Conflict, 
taking into consideration the interna-
tional background conditions as well as 
the internal ethic and political frag-
mentation and the absence of offsetting 
international and domestic 
countervailing institutions termed 
"accelerators"; 
iv) Alex Schmidt and Bero Jongman of 
PIOOM (Programma Interdisciplinair 
Onderzoek naar Oorzaken van 
Mensenrechtenschendingen, in English: 
Interdisciplinary Research Program on 
Root Causes of Human Rights 
Violations) at the Center for the Study 
of Social Conflicts of Leiden 
University, has undertaken to Monitor 
Early Warning of Humanitarian Crises 
through data on cuI tural, social, 
economic and political conditions 
correlated with Human Rights 
Violations and has proposed 
developing a model-driven forecast 
system for assessing the risk of political 
and humanitarian crises based on 
conflict-related indicators using a broad 
data-gathering effort based on actual 
monitoring, combined with a statistical 
model and an expert-based co-
assessment; 
v) the late Frank Sherman (along with 
Gavan Duffy and Stuart Thorson) at 
Syracuse University, worked with 
SHERFACS, a data set summarizing 
the conflict trajectories and manage-
ment efforts of over 1400 international 
disputes and twice as many intrastate 
disputes since 1945; Alex Schmid has 
been the only one to run a test of two 
models; 
vi) Professor David Singer of the Depart-
ment of Political Science, University of 
Michigan works on Early Warning 
Signals for Culturally Distinct Groups 
in Danger; 
vii) Rodney Tomlinson, Department of 
Political Science, U.S. Naval Academy, 
works with WEISS (World 
Event/Interaction Survey), a feedback 
survey model to ascertain the 
willingness of the respective parties to 
cooperate or engage in conflict; 
viii) Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Department of 
Government and Politics at the 
University of Maryland, and Michael 
Breecher of the Political Science 
Department at McGill University in 
Montreal, have applied their Model of 
Crisis, Conflict and Instability to the 
Ethnopolitical Dimensions of in-
ternational crises. 
5. Alex Schmid, "Early Detection of Emerg-
ing Political and Humanitarian Crises: An 
Early Warning Model for Assessing
Ramcharan, B. G. 1991. The International Law 
and Practice of Early-Warning and Preven-
tive Diplomacy: The Emerging Global 
Watch. Dordrecht, Boston: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers. 
-.1996 (November). Unpublished presen 
 tation. Clingendael, The Netherlands. CI 
References
Country Proneness to Conflict Escalation," 
PlOOM, p. 3. 
6. There have been some efforts, however. The 
rather open Burundi Policy Forum and the 
more restricted Burundi Security Forum 
were instituted to connect intelligence from 
both states, academics and NGOs 
specializing in human rights monitoring, 
refugee advocacy, conflict resolution, and 
emergency relief to share information and 
devise appropriate responses from the 
extreme of deploying standby forces to 
more modest efforts geared to impeding 
arms flows, freezing extremist leaders' 
foreign bank accounts or their abilities to 
travel. 
7. The initial founding members included 
UNDHA, UNHCR, PIOOM, Centre for 
Preventive Action-council on Foreign 
Relations, the Prevention/Early Warning 
Unit of the Centre for Refugee Studies and 
the Centre for International and Security 
Studies at York University. The interim and 
temporary secretariat was housed at York. 
In addition to the founding members, 
scheduled to attend the second meeting in 
January of 1997 are CSS-Ethnobarometer, 
the Centre for European Studies (CEPS), a 
representative of the European Parliament, 
the Swiss Peace Foundation, the Institute of 
Ethnology and Anthropology-Russian 
Academy of Science, as well as repre-
sentatives from Canada, Switzerland, and
possibly some of the Scandinavian 
countries. Three pilot area studies have 
been initiated. For example, the Early 
Warning/Prevention Unit at York Uni-
versity initiated a WARN (Western Africa 
Research Network) primarily focused on 
Nigeria.
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